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ESSAY 
THE MEDIA EXEMPTION PUZZLE  
OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAWS 
SONJA R. WEST† 
In the 2010 case of Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, the 
United States Supreme Court held that a federal law that placed some 
restrictions on corporate campaign expenditures was unconstitutional.1 In 
dissent, Justice John Paul Stevens argued that in order to reach this conclusion 
the majority had purposefully constructed a “newly-minted First 
Amendment rule” designed to block any and all congressional attempts to 
regulate this type of spending.2 He claimed, in essence, that the Court had 
trapped Congress in a legislative box—a box that in campaign finance law is 
known as the media exemption problem. 
The problem is this: When attempting to address concerns about corporate 
campaign expenditures (i.e., corporate political speech), Congress essentially 
has two options. The first option is to exempt media corporations from 
campaign expenditure regulations. Yet if Congress does this, then the Court 
claims that Congress has engaged in unconstitutional speaker discrimination 
by treating one group of speakers differently from another. The other option, 
however, is to regulate the campaign expenditures of all corporations, including 
media corporations. But if Congress tries this approach, the Court accuses it of 
violating basic press freedoms by interfering with the speech rights of the 
media. Thus, in the words of Justice Stevens, under the majority’s constitutional 
framework, Congress is “damned if it does and damned if it doesn’t.”3 
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1 558 U.S. 310, 372 (2010). 
2 Id. at 474 n.75 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
3 Id.; see also id. (“If the legislature gives media corporations an exemption from electioneering 
regulations that apply to other corporations, it violates the newly minted First Amendment rule 
against identity-based distinctions. If the legislature does not give media corporations an exemption, 
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More specifically, here is how the media exemption problem worked in 
Citizens United: That case involved a federal law prohibiting corporations and 
unions from using their general treasury funds to make independent 
expenditures for speech expressly advocating for or against a candidate.4 Like 
many campaign finance laws throughout the country, this law included an 
exemption for the media’s news stories, commentaries, and editorials.5 
In the view of the majority, this media exemption raised significant 
constitutional problems. It was unfair, they argued, to allow government 
regulation of some corporate speakers—nonmedia corporations—but not of 
media corporations.6 At the same time, however, because the news media’s 
political speech falls at the core of our First Amendment protections, if a law 
regulated all corporations, including media corporations, it would violate the 
First Amendment.7 
Therefore, under the Court’s reasoning, the government may not regulate 
only some corporations, and it also may not regulate all of them. As Justice 
Stevens explained, “[t]he only way out of this invented bind: no regulations 
whatsoever.”8 
The media exemption dilemma in campaign finance law is nothing new, 
but Citizens United appears to have solidified it. In his recent book, Plutocrats 
United, Professor Richard Hasen declares the media exemption issue to be 
“the third rail of the campaign finance debate.”9 Campaign finance reform 
advocates, he argues, have found themselves in a no-win situation: “Say that 
there should be an exception, and you run the risk of inconsistency or outright 
hypocrisy; say there should not be an exception and you are considered too 
extreme.”10 Seeing no way out, Hasen notes, they often choose to “simply 
ignore [] or quickly gloss over” the problem.11 
Yet the question of how to treat the press in campaign finance law can no 
longer be ignored. For the discussion to move forward, it is necessary to 
determine whether Congress, without running afoul of the First Amendment, 
 
it violates the First Amendment rights of the press. The only way out of this invented bind: no 
regulations whatsoever.”). 
4 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2006) (section subsequently transferred to 52 U.S.C.A. § 30118 (West 2015)). 
5 See 2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(B)(i) (2006) (section subsequently transferred to 52 U.S.C.A. 
§ 30101(9)(B)(i) (West 2015)) (exempting by definition “any news story, commentary, or editorial 
distributed through the facilities of any broadcasting station, newspaper, magazine, or other 
periodical publication, unless such facilities are owned or controlled by any political party, political 
committee, or candidate”). 
6 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 352 (majority opinion). 
7 Id. at 353. 
8 Id. at 474 n.75 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
9 RICHARD L. HASEN, PLUTOCRATS UNITED: CAMPAIGN MONEY, THE SUPREME COURT, 
AND THE DISTORTION OF AMERICAN ELECTIONS 127 (2016). 
10 Id. at 126. 
11 Id. 
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can ever regulate the political speech of nonmedia speakers. Left 
unchallenged, the faulty logic of the Citizens United majority will always favor 
corporations’ speech interests in campaign expenditures over the public’s 
interests in reducing the influence of big money in politics, promoting  
self-government or increasing political equality. 
Thus it is critical to determine whether, in a post-Citizens United world, 
there is a way out of the campaign finance media exemption box. 
The answer is, quite simply, yes. Exempting the press from campaign 
finance regulations is not the impenetrable quandary the Citizens United 
majority made it appear. In fact, the solution is quite obvious as soon as the 
fundamental flaw of the majority’s logic is understood. That flaw is the 
Court’s failure to recognize that the press is different from other types of 
speakers. The press is different textually. It is different historically. And it is 
different functionally. Once the special constitutional role of the press is 
acknowledged, the media exemption problem loses its force. 
Objections to media exemptions focus on two issues—justification and 
definition. The justification criticisms question whether there are acceptable 
reasons why we should grant protections to certain types of speakers (those 
that are members of the press) and not to others.12 The definition arguments, 
meanwhile, claim that there is no acceptable way to identify which speakers 
should be allowed to claim a media exemption and which should not.13 
 
12 See, e.g., First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978) (“The inherent worth 
of the speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public does not depend upon the identity of 
its source, whether corporation, association, union, or individual.”); id. at 782 n.18 (noting that 
granting institutional press greater protection would conflict with the “informational purpose of the 
First Amendment,” and surmising that the people may be as interested in hearing the views of the 
appellants as those of a media corporation); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 705 (1972) (“The 
informative function asserted by representatives of the organized press in the present cases is also 
performed by lecturers, political pollsters, novelists, academic researchers, and dramatists. Almost 
any author may quite accurately assert that he is contributing to the flow of information to the 
public, that he relies on confidential sources of information, and that these sources will be silenced 
if he is forced to make disclosures before a grand jury.”); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 
(1938) (“The liberty of the press is not confined to newspapers and periodicals. It necessarily 
embraces pamphlets and leaflets. These indeed have been historic weapons in the defense of liberty, 
as the pamphlets of Thomas Paine and others in our own history abundantly attest.”); Lyrissa 
Barnett Lidsky, Not a Free Press Court?, 2012 BYU L. REV. 1819, 1833 (“[The Citizens United majority 
implied that] media corporations are elitist, wield political power and influence disproportionate to 
their public support, and are no more deserving of ‘special’ protection than any other corporation.”). 
13 See, e.g., Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 704-05 (“Sooner or later, it would be necessary to define 
those categories of newsmen who qualified for the privilege, a questionable procedure . . . .”); In re 
Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 438 F.3d 1141, 1156-58 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (Sentelle, J., concurring) 
(highlighting the definitional problems with privileging the press and surveying the various and 
incompatible ways that state legislatures define who is protected under their shield statutes); 
Michael W. McConnell, Reconsidering Citizens United as a Press Clause Case, 123 YALE L.J. 412, 438 
(2013) (“There is no coherent way to distinguish the institutional press from others who disseminate 
information and opinion to the public through communications media.”); David B. Sentelle, Freedom 
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In Citizens United, the majority made both types of arguments. First, the 
majority claimed that there was no justification for differing treatment of 
media speakers vis-à-vis nonmedia speakers. If Congress’s purpose in 
regulating corporate political spending was to prevent wealthy corporations 
from distorting the political debate, the Court reasoned, then many media 
corporations, which have also accumulated immense wealth from the 
corporate form, should also be included.14 Placing regulatory burdens on 
certain corporate speakers but not on the press, the majority also argued, 
would distort the public dialogue in favor of the media’s views, which do not 
always mirror the views of the public at large.15 
A similar justification argument is foreseeable under a political equality 
rationale. That is, if the purpose of a regulation is to promote equal voices, 
failure to exempt the press would allow the media to have a louder voice than 
nonmedia speakers. And yet simply regulating media corporations in addition 
to other corporations was also not an answer, according to the Court, because 
suppressing the political speech of the press would be contrary to the original 
understanding of the First Amendment.16 
But as Justice Stevens pointed out in his Citizens United dissent, these 
arguments overlook the significant textual and historic evidence establishing 
that the press can and should be treated differently. The most vital piece of 
the constitutional puzzle, he explained, was not the First Amendment’s Free 
Speech Clause but the one that follows—the Press Clause.17 By specifically 
protecting the freedom of the press, Justice Stevens stated, the Framers 
demonstrated “why one type of corporation, those that are part of the press, 
might be able to claim special First Amendment status.”18 Indeed, as Justice 
Potter Stewart famously pointed out, through the Press Clause the Framers 
made the media “the only organized private business that is given explicit 
constitutional protection.”19 
Beyond the clear textual protection for the press, the history of the Press 
Clause also demonstrates its uniqueness. The framing generation placed a 
substantial premium on press liberties, even over speech rights.20 James 
 
of the Press: A Liberty for All or a Privilege for a Few?, 2013–2014 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 15, 19 (“Perhaps 
it is this problem of definition raised by Chief Justice Burger that best illustrates the difficulty with 
the proposition that the freedom of the press protects a class of persons rather than all persons.”). 
14 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 351-52 (2010) (majority opinion). 
15 Id. at 352-53. 
16 Id. at 353. 
17 U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 2. 
18 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 431 n.57 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
19 Potter Stewart, “Or of the Press,” 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 633 (1975). 
20 See David A. Anderson, The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REV. 455, 508 (1983) 
(“The textual antecedents of the first amendment reflect a greater concern with press than with 
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Madison declared press freedom to be of the “choicest privileges of the 
people” and proposed language to make press freedom “inviolable.”21 It was 
hailed as “one of the greatest bulwarks of liberty”22 and “essential to the 
security of freedom in a state.”23 
Numerous Supreme Court decisions, moreover, have demonstrated the 
special constitutional status of the press by detailing the unique functions that 
the press fulfills in our democracy. These functions include informing the 
public of newsworthy matters24 and restraining the government and the 
powerful.25 Not only does the Constitution recognize and safeguard the 
press’s role in furthering these structural goals, but the Court also has 
recognized the ability of legislatures to provide additional press protections.26 
Again, in the words of Justice Stevens, when legislators enact media 
exemptions they are simply recognizing “the unique role played by the 
institutional press in sustaining public debate.”27 
The Citizens United majority also raised a definitional objection. It 
asserted that, even accepting “the most doubtful proposition” that media 
corporations could be exempted from campaign finance laws, it is unclear which 
corporations should be considered “media” corporations.28 Thanks to modern 
technology, the majority stated, “the line between the media and others who 
wish to comment on political and social issues becomes far more blurred.”29 
The definitional argument against a media exemption, however, is not as 
unworkable as the Court described it. When it comes to recognizing 
constitutional protections, the fact that courts will be called on to determine 
some potentially blurry boundaries is not a death sentence. Courts, of course, 
 
speech.”); see also Sonja R. West, The “Press,” Then & Now, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2016) 
(detailing the historical evidence that the framing generation highly valued press freedoms). 
21 JEFFERY A. SMITH, PRINTERS AND PRESS FREEDOM: THE IDEOLOGY OF EARLY 
AMERICAN JOURNALISM 166 (1988). 
22 Virginia Declaration of Rights § 12 (1776), reprinted in 1 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL 
OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 234, 235 (1971). 
23 Massachusetts Declaration of Rights art. XVI (1780), reprinted in SCHWARTZ, supra note 22, 
at 339, 342. 
24 See, e.g., Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936) (declaring “an untrammeled 
press [to be] a vital source of public information”). 
25 See, e.g., Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 447 (1991) (stating that “[t]he press plays a 
unique role as a check on government abuse”). See generally Sonja R. West, The Stealth Press Clause, 
48 GA. L. REV. 729, 753-55 (2014). 
26 See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 706 (1972) (“At the federal level, Congress has 
freedom to determine whether a statutory newsman’s privilege is necessary and desirable and to 
fashion standards and rules as narrow or broad as deemed necessary to deal with the evil discerned 
and, equally important, to refashion those rules as experience from time to time may dictate.”). 
27 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 417 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
28 Id. at 352-53 (majority opinion). 
29 Id. at 352. 
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deal with ambiguous terminology and gray areas in constitutional law on a 
regular basis without being forced to declare the entire undertaking undoable. 
The issue of free speech alone, for example, has forced the Court to draw 
surely imperfect lines between all kinds of protected and unprotected 
speech—including commercial speech, obscenity, fighting words, incitement, 
and threats. And the Court has maneuvered through issues of content-based 
and content-neutral regulations, questions of speech versus conduct, as well 
as problems of overbreadth and vagueness. There is simply no reason to 
assume that when it comes to defining the press, the task of constitutional 
interpretation is unusually difficult.30 
The media exemption problem is only a problem if the Court continues 
to ignore the significant constitutional evidence of press uniqueness. Non-press 
speakers simply are not—and never have been treated as—the same as the 
press. And, as Justice Stevens stressed in Citizens United: “Once one accepts 
that much, the intellectual edifice of the majority opinion crumbles.”31  
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30 For a discussion of how to distinguish press speakers from non-press speakers, see Sonja R. 
West, Press Exceptionalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2434 (2014). 
31 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 431 n.57 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 
